Appellant homeowner sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County (California), which granted summary adjudication to respondent manufacturer on causes of action for breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. Appellant sought counsel from a small business attorney.

A contractor purchased roof shingles and added them to the homeowner's existing home. The homeowner later found cracks in many of the shingles. Dissatisfied with the manufacturer's settlement offer, the homeowner brought suit. The trial court ruled that the shingles were not consumer goods under the Magnuson-Moss Act and that the cause of action for breach of implied warranty was barred because the breach occurred after the expiration of the one year implied warranty period governed by Civ. Code, § 1791.1. The court concluded that the shingles were consumer products as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) because they were incorporated into the realty and were not purchased as part of real estate covered by a written warranty, as contemplated by 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(e), (f) (2006). As to the implied warranty claim, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) did not mandate the length of the implied warranty; rather, state law applied. The court determined that Civ. Code, § 1791.1, not Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2725, controlled the length of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Act. Thus, the duration of the implied warranty of merchantability under California law was limited to one year.

The court reversed the summary adjudication as to the homeowner's cause of action for breach of written warranty, remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, and affirmed in all other respects.

In an action that was based on the presence of mold in condominium units, plaintiff condominium unit owner appealed a judgment entered by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, after a jury trial in which the jury found that there was no insurance coverage and no breach of the insurance contract by defendant insurer, but the jury also found the insurer negligently investigated the owner's claim. The insurer also appealed.

The insurance policy issued to the owner excluded coverage for mold unless a covered peril was the predominant cause of the mold. The owner, who had submitted an additional living expense claim, argued that she was entitled to a new trial on her claims for contract breach and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the insurer. The court concluded that there was no tort liability on the insurer's part for negligent investigation of the owner's first party insurance claim. None of the circumstances allowing for a contract claim to be pursued as a tort cause of action were present. The cause of action at issue was not breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but negligence. Because no benefits were due, the insurer's allegedly negligent investigation did not frustrate the owner's right to the benefits of the contract. The owner suffered no injury as a result of the manner in which the insurer conducted its investigation. Whatever the merits of the owner's assertion of inadequate investigation, the fact that the investigation yielded a correct conclusion of no coverage precluded any claim that the inadequacy caused her any damage.

The court reversed the owner's judgment against the insurer for negligent investigation, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.